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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RANDY M. LANE ] 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
-vs-
THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ] 
UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY, ] 
Defendant - ] 
Respondent. 
Case No. 20888 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a review of a decision of the Board of 
Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah (hereinafter 
"Board") pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 35-4-10(i) (1953 & 
Supp. 1985) which reversed the decision of the Administrative 
Law Judge (hereinafter "ALJ") allowing unemployment 
compensation benefits to appellant Randy Lane (hereinafter 
"Lane") effective April 14, 1985, on the basis that he was 
discharged from his employment for "just cause". 
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DISPOSITION BELOW 
Lane filed a claim for unemployment compensation 
benefits on April 15r 1985. A Department of Employment 
Security Representative, in a decision dated April 28, 1985, 
denied that claim effective April 14, 1985. Lane filed a 
timely appeal of the denial of benefits to an ALJ who 
conducted an administrative hearing on June 5r 1985. Lane 
was not represented at that hearing. The ALJ took evidence 
and heard testimony and thereafter reversed the decision of 
the Department Representative and allowed benefits for the 
reason that Lane's conduct was not so culpable as to merit a 
disqualification pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 35-4-5(b)(l) 
(1953 & Supp. 1985). Lane's employer, Telum, Inc. 
(hereinafter "Telum") filed an appeal of the ALJ's decision 
with the Board on July 1, 1985. The Board reversed the 
decision of the ALJ based on a finding that Lane was 
discharged for just cause, thereby denying him unemployment 
compensation benefits pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 
35-4~5(b)(l) (1953 & Supp. 1985). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Lane requests this Court to reverse the decision of 
the Board and enter an order that he is entitled, as a matter 
of law, to unemployment compensation benefits from April 14, 
1985, until he is no longer otherwise eligible. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Lane was employed by Telum as a co-assistant 
manager with his wife of a diesel fuel truck stop from March 
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20, 1980r through April 7, 1985. (R.0044). On April 7, 1985, 
Lane was fired from his employment with Telum for selling 
beer to a minor. (R.0048,0068,0070). The incident for which 
Lane was discharged occurred at 10:30 p.m., April 5, 1985. 
(R.0037,0065). On that evening Lane and his wife were 
working at the gas station. Officer Steve Johnson of the 
Parowan City Police Department entered the station and asked 
to see Lane's wife. The officer and Lane's wife went into 
the backroom of the station at which time Officer Johnson 
informed Mrs. Lane that she was under arrest for selling beer 
to a minor. She denied the accusation. Officer Johnson 
stated that he had seen the sale through the window with 
binoculars. After Mrs. Lane continued to deny the 
accusation, Officer Johnson took Mrs. Lane outside to "take a 
look at the kid" who purchased the beer. That person changed 
his story and said it was Mr. Lane who sold him the beer. 
Thereafter, Mr. Lane was issued a citation for selling 
alcohol to a minor. (R.0045,0046,0065). 
Lane did, in fact, sell beer to the person alleged 
to be a minor and he did not check the person for 
identification prior to the sale. (R.0054). The person he 
sold the beer to was in the station when it was crowded. 
(R.0057,0060,0071). The person was wearing old clothes, had 
a beard and a slouched hat and appeared to Lane to be over 21 
years old, therefore not requiring any identification for the 
beer purchase. (R.0057). 
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Lane was aware of a company policy that beer was 
not to be sold to minors, (R.0054). It was the accepted 
arrangement to check the identification of any person seeking 
to purchase beer whose age was questionable, (R.0071). The 
person to whom Lane sold the beer did not appear to be of 
questionable age. (R.0057,0071)• 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. The Board specifically applied Utah Department 
of Employment Security Proposed Rule A71-07-1:5(A) to the 
facts of this case in determining that Lane was discharged 
for just cause. Howeverf the Utah Administrative Rulemaking 
Act specifies certain procedural requirements which must be 
complied with before a rule takes effect. The Department of 
Employment Security did not adopt a final version of the rule 
nor publish the rule's effective date. Thus, the proposed 
rule is invalid since it was not adopted in compliance with 
the procedural requirements of the Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act. 
B. Even assuming arguendo that Utah Department of 
Employment Security Proposed Rule A-71-07-1:5(A) is 
applicable its application requires a finding that Lane was 
not discharged for just cause. The Board's decision to the 
contrary which reversed the ALJ is unreasonable and 
irrational. Just cause is premised on a finding of fault and 
requires consideration of three elements: culpability, 
knowledge and control. When Lane's actions are considered 
under this standard a finding of just cause is unreasonable 
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and irrational. Lane's conduct was an isolated incident of 
poor judgment and shows no wrongness or culpability* 
Further, Lane's employer did not provide a clear explanation 
of expected behavior or have a pertinent written policy. 
Thus, Lane had no clear knowledge that his actions would 
result in termination. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
PROPOSED RULE A71-01-1:5(A) IS INVALID 
AND UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE IT WAS NOT 
ADOPTED AS A FINAL RULE PURSUANT TO THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE 
RULEMAKING ACT. 
The Board specifically applied Utah Department of 
Employment Security (hereinafter "UDES") Proposed Rule 
A71-07-l:5(A)(3) to the facts of this case in determining 
that Lane was discharged for "just cause" as that term is 
used in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 35-4-5(b)(l) (1953 & Supp. 1985). 
UDES Proposed Rule A71-07-1:5(A) is attached hereto as 
Appendix A. This court has held that an administrative law 
judge's decision based on UDES Proposed Rule A71-07-1:5(A)(2) 
was reasonable and rational and that its application to the 
facts of that case was proper. Kehl v. Board of Review, 700 
P.2d 1129r 1133 (Utah 1985). However, Lane submits that the 
parties in Kehl did not brief and the Utah Supreme Court did 
not address the procedural aspect involved in adopting and 
applying an administrative regulation, that is, whether the 
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proposed rule is invalid and unenforceable because it was not 
adopted pursuant to the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
The parties in Kehl only argued whether the proposed 
regulation met the reasonable and rational standard of 
review, See Brief for Respondent at 7-14, and whether the 
facts satisfied the just cause requirement, See Brief for 
Appellant at 3-8. 
In the administrative law context, courts typically 
review three aspects of agency determinationss statutory, 
substantive and procedural, R. Pierce, Administrative Law and 
Process, Sec, 5.1 (1985). The statutory element refers to 
determining whether the agency has the power to promulgate 
the regulation involved. The substantive element refers to 
the standard of review a court uses in reviewing the agency 
decision, in this cases whether the agency decision is 
reasonable and rational. The procedural element refers to 
whether the rule was adopted in conformity with the statutory 
requirements for adopting a rule or regulation. 
Lane does not contend that the Industrial 
Commission is not authorized to promulgate the rule at issue 
pursuant to its powers set forth in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 
35-4-ll(a)(1) (1953 & Supp. 1985). The substantive issue is 
The Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act was adopted in 1973 
and has been amended several times since then. Utah Code 
Ann. Sec. 63-46-1 ej: seq. (1953 & Supp. 1984). This Act was 
repealed on April 29, 1985, and replaced with a new Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act. Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-46a-l 
et seq. (1953 & Supp. 1985). The choice of law issue is 
discussed infra. 
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discussed in Point II, infra. However, the Board applied a 
proposed rule which had not been adopted in final form 
pursuant to the requirements of the Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act* The Kehl case did not address the propriety 
of applying a rule which had not been adopted pursuant to 
statutory requirements and, therefore, is not dispositive of 
the instant case. 
At the outset it is necessary to recognize that 
there are two potentially pertinent rulemaking acts* The 
first Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act was adopted in 1973* 
Utah Code Ann, Sec. 63-46-1 ejb seq. (1953 & Supp. 1984), 
That Act was repealed on April 29, 1985r and replaced with a 
new Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act* Utah Code Ann. Sec. 
63-46a-l e_t seq. (1953 & Supp. 1985). Two important dates in 
the instant case straddle the effective date of the 1985 Act. 
UDES set the rulemaking procedure in motion when it filed the 
notice of Proposed Rule A71-01-1.5 on March 20, 1985. Utah 
State Bulletin, No. 85-7, at 10 (April 1, 1985). The filing 
of the proposed rule prior to the effective date of the 1985 
Act indicates that the procedures under the 1973 Act should 
be applied. On the other hand, the proposed rule was applied 
to the instant case after the 1985 Act took effect. However, 
as will be seen, the application of either the 1973 Act or 
the 1985 Act will result in an identical outcome. 
The 1973 Act and the 1985 Act do not apply to every 
policy statement promulgated by an administrative agency. 
Each governs only when the particular issuance comes within 
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the definition of a "Rule", The terra "Rule" is given 
meaning under both the 1973 and 1985 ActSo A "Rule" 
defined in the 1973 Act ass 
Each statement of general applicability 
adopted by an agency that implements or 
interprets the law or prescribes the 
policy of the agency in the 
administration of its functions or 
describes the organization, procedure, or 
practice requirements of any agency, 
including any amendment or repeal of a 
prior rule. "Rule" does not include : 
(a) rules or regulations concerning only 
the internal management of an agency not 
affecting private rights or procedures 
available to the public including those 
of the state board of education in its 
relationships with local boards of 
education, or (b) declaratory rulings 
issued pursuant to section 63-46-10, or 
(c) intra-agency memoranda. 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-46-3(4) (1953 & Supp. 1984). 
Similarly, under the 1985 Act a Rule: 
means a statement made by an agency that 
applies to a general class of persons, 
rather than specific persons and: (i) 
implements or interprets policy made by 
statute; or (ii) prescribes the policy of 
the agency in the absence of express 
statutory policy? or (iii) prescribes the 
administration of the agency's functions 
or describes its organization, 
procedures, and operations. "Rule" 
includes the amendment or repeal of an 
existing rule. "Rule" does not include: 
(i) statements concerning only the 
internal management of an agency and 
which do not affect private persons as a 
class, other agencies, or other 
governmental entities; (ii) declaratory 
rulings pursuant to Section 63-46a-14; or 
(iii) executive orders. 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-46a-2(1)(8)(a) and (b). 
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In the instant case UDES Proposed Rule 
A71-07-1:5(A) meets the definition of a "Rule" under either 
Act. Clearly it applies to a general class of persons. The 
very purpose of proposing the rule was to include the rule in 
the UDES Rules and Regulations so as to have a comprehensive 
scheme for administering the Employment Security Act. UDES 
Proposed Rule A71-07-1:5(A) is addressed to indicated but 
unnamed and unspecified persons and situations and, 
therefore, is a rule of general applicability. It is a rule 
that is being applied to all future cases of which the 
instant case is one. Thus, the proposed rule is subject to 
the rulemaking provisions of either Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act. Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-46-5 (1953 & Supp. 
1984) or Sec. 63-46a-3(3) (1953 & Supp. 1985). 
After a proposed rule has been drafted, the agency 
must comply with certain procedural requirements before it 
takes effect. The procedure mandated by both the 1973 Act 
and the 1985 Act consists of three major elements: (1) notice 
of intent to implement the rule, (2) opportunity for public 
comment, and (3) adoption. In the instant case, the 
Industrial Commission provided notice of its intent to adopt 
the Rule on March 20, 1985. Utah State Bulletin, No. 85-7 at 
10 (April 1, 1985). It also allowed an opportunity for 
public comment. However, the agency has not adopted a final 
version of the rule and filed it pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Sec. 63-46-6 of the 1973 Act. Nor has it provided 
notification to the Office of Administrative Rules of when 
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the rule becomes effective so that the effective date could 
be published in the Utah State Bulletin as required by Utah 
Code Ann. Sec. 63-46a-4(a) of the 1985 Act. 
The legal consequence of the Industrial 
Commission's failure to follow the required rulemaking 
procedure is apparent. The drafters of both the 1973 and the 
1985 Acts mandated that noncompliance with the Act would 
render the rule invalid. The 1973 Act provides that "no rule 
hereafter adopted is valid unless adopted in substantial 
compliance with this section. Utah Code Ann. Sec. 
63-46-5(b)(6) (1953 & Supp. 1984). Furthermore, Utah Code 
Ann. Sec. 63-46-5.3 (1953 & Supp. 1984) provided that: 
A rule adopted more than 60 days after 
the final day of any public hearing, or 
after publication of the rule in 
accordance with section 63-46-6 if no 
hearings are held regarding the rule, 
shall not be valid. 
The 1985 Act impliedly recognizes the invalidity of a rule 
that was not adopted in compliance with the procedural 
requirements of the Act by enacting a statute which limits 
such a cause of action to two years. Utah Code Ann. Sec. 
63-46a-14 (1953 & Supp. 1985). 
It is a basic principle of administrative law that 
a rule has no effect if not adopted in compliance with 
procedural requirements. See Buschmann v. Schweiker, 676 
Fed. 352 (9th Cir. 1982) and cases cited therein. The 
corollary of that principle is that a valid rule or 
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regulation has the force and effect of law, Chrysler Corp. v. 
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 99 S. Ct. 1705, 60 L. Ed.2d 208 (1979); 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 41 L. 
Ed.2d 1039 (1974); State v. Kerry, 663 P.2d 500 (Wash App. 
1983); Higginson v. Westergard, 100 Idaho 687, 604 P.2d 51 
(Idaho 1979); Appeal of J.G. Masonary, 235 Kan. 497, 680 P.2d 
291 (Kansas 1984); Nevada Tax Commission v. Saveway, 668 P.2d 
291 (Nev. 1983); Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976 (Wy. 1984). 
Since rules have the full force and effect of law 
affecting legal rights and obligations in the same manner as 
laws enacted by the legislature, strict compliance with the 
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act is a sine qua non of a 
fair administrative law system. Otherwise, parties are 
prejudiced by an agency's failure to give notice of a new 
rule and its effective date. Noncompliance with an adoption 
procedure prevents potentially affected parties from timely 
structuring their affairs to account for new regulations. 
See A.Bonfield, The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act -
Background, Construction, Applicability, Public Access to 
Agency Law, The Rulemaking Process, 60 la L.Rev. 731, 873-74 
(1975). Further, allowing an agency to apply a rule not 
promulgated pursuant to the statutory requirements sends a 
message to agencies that rulemaking provisions will not be 
enforced, with the effect of ultimately destroying the 
purpose of the Act. J[d. Technical noncompliance with the 
Rulemaking Act should not be tolerated. This is especially 
true in the instant case, since there has been no notice that 
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the UDES Proposed Rule A71-07-1:5(A) has been adopted as a 
final rule with an effective date. 
Application of the proposed rule by the Industrial 
Commission and the Board allows them, in essence, to apply a 
"secret law." And, by analogizing the Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act to the Federal Register Act, which requires 
publication of proposed and final federal administrative 
rules, a federal circuit court has held the purpose of the 
Act was "to eliminate the problem of secret law." Cervase v. 
Office of Federal Register, 580 F.2d 1166, 1171 (3rd Cir. 
1978). 
The result of applying to Lane a proposed rule 
which has the force and effect of law is unbearable when 
there is the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act - a procedure 
for a system of rules publication. To quote an English 
observers 
It would be intolerable if it could be 
said that obscure clerks in Whitehall 
poured forth streams of departmental 
legislation which nobody had any means of 
knowing. This would be the method 
attributed to Caligula of writing his 
laws in very small characters and hanging 
them up on high pillars "the more 
effectively to ensnare the people'. 
Carr, in committee on Ministers' Powers, Minutes of Evidence 
208 (1932). 
Finally, the remedy for applying a proposed rule 
which is invalid because it was not adopted pursuant to the 
statutory procedures of the Utah Administrative Rulemaking 
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Act is reversal* The Nevada Supreme Court reversed a lower 
court decision which applied a rate-making schedule not 
promulgated according to the state's rulemaking statute, 
Gibben v. Archie, 548 P.2d 1366, 1367 (Nev. 1976). Similarly 
the United States Supreme Court invalidated the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs refusal to grant an Indian family's request 
for financial aid because the denial was based on a rule 
which had not been adopted pursuant to the Administrative 
Procedure Act. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199f 94 S.Ct. 1055r 
39 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974). Lane submits the Utah Supreme Court 
should do the same in the instant case. 
POINT II 
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT PROPOSED RULE 
A71-07-l:5(A) IS APPLICABLE, THE DECISION 
OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW REVERSING THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S DECISION IS 
UNREASONABLE AND IRRATIONAL SINCE THE 
BOARD MISAPPLIED THE FACTS TO THE LAW IN 
HOLDING THAT LANE'S CONDUCT SUPPORTED A 
DISCHARGE FOR "JUST CAUSE" 
The appropriate standard of review in a case such 
as this is stated in Kehl v. Board of Review, 700 P.2d at 
1133. In that case involving a discharge for just cause the 
court applied the "intermediate" standard of review outlined 
in Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public 
Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601, 609-612 (Utah 1983). After 
quoting the standard as expressed in Utah Department of 
Administrative Services the court in Kehl, at 1133, held that 
"... unless the administrative law judge's decision based on 
the proposed rules and regulations is outside the limits of 
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reasonableness or rationality, we will uphold it." This 
standard has been applied by the Court in subsequent cases. 
Board of Education of Seiver County v. Board of Reviewr 701 
P.2d 1064, 1067 (Utah 1985); Wrights Furniture Mill, Inc. v. 
Industrial Commission, 19 Utah Adv. Rep. 8,9 (Utah 1985)? 
Rahimi v. Board of Review, 19 Utah Adv. Rep. 9,10 (Utah 
1985) . 
The Utah Supreme Court has held on several 
occasions that the Board of Review exceeded the limits of 
reasonableness. Clearfield City v. Department of Employment 
Security, 663 P,2d 440 (Utah 1983); Trotta v. Department of 
Employment Security, 664 P.2d 1195, (Utah 1983); Western 
Dairymen Cooperative, Inc. v. Board of Review, 684 P.2d 647 
(Utah 1985). In addition, the Supreme Court is required to 
review the record below, Martinez v. Board of Review, 567 
P.2d 626 (Utah 1977), and is not bound by conclusions of the 
Board of Review nor will it substitute missing findings in 
order to corroborate a decision of the Board of Review which 
is not supported by the record. Gocke v. Wiesly, 420 P.2d 44 
(Utah 1966). 
In the present case, the decision of the Board, 
which reversed the ALJ's award of benefits, was unreasonable 
and irrational and, therefore, must be reversed. The ALJ in 
his June 24, 1985, decision concluded that* 
Even though selling alcoholic beverages 
to minors is a serious offense, the 
evidence in this case established that 
the claimant had committed an error in 
judgment but there was nothing to show a 
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deliberate or willful action against the 
employer* He mistakenly believed the 
individual was of legal age. The 
employer did not have any definite policy 
regarding age verification. The claimant 
had not had any prior problems with 
discipline and it is determined the 
situation was an isolated incident. The 
event was not culpable to such a degree 
as to merit a disqualification under 
Section 35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah 
Employment Security Act. It isf 
therefore, concluded the claimant was not 
discharged for just cause in accordance 
with the Utah Employment Security Act. 
(R.0032) 
The ALJ considered the credibility and demeanor of Lane and 
his witness and determined that Lane mistakenly believed the 
individual to whom he sold the beer was of legal age to 
purchase it. Thisf combined with the fact that the employer 
had no definite policy regarding age verification, led the 
ALJ to conclude that Lane's conduct was not culpable to such 
a degree as to merit a disqualification and therefore he "was 
not discharged for just cause." As the ALJ concluded, Lane 
"had committed an error in judgment." (R.0032). Such a 
finding is based in large part on the credibility and 
demeanor of Lane. Where, as in the present case, culpability 
and knowledge are determinative factors, substantial 
deference should be given to the ALJ since he had the 
opportunity to weigh the credibility of Lane and his witness. 
The Board's decision was made by reviewing only a bare 
transcript. The Board did not have the opportunity to 
observe Lane and his witness and judge their credibility, as 
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did the ALJ. Therefore, substantial deference should be 
given to the ALJ's decision. 
Considering the deference which should be given to 
the ALJ's decision and applying the facts of this case to 
UDES Proposed Rule A71-07-1:5(A), a finding should have been 
made that Lane was not terminated with just cause. The 
Board's decision to the contrary is unreasonable and 
irrational. The proposed rule requires that in order for 
there to be just cause for a discharge pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. Sec. 35-4-5(b)(l) (1953 & Supp. 1985) there must be some 
fault on the part of the employee. UDES Proposed Rule 
A71-07-1J5(A)(2). The proposed rule further provides that 
there are three basic factors which establish fault and are 
essential for a determination of ineligibility under the 
definition of just cause: culpability, knowledge and 
control. UDES Proposed Rule A71-07-1:5(A)(3). Lane submits 
that the evidence in the record supports the ALJ's decision 
that Lane was not discharged for just cause. 
First, Lane's conduct was not culpable within the 
meaning of UDES Proposed Rule A71-07-1:5(A)(3)(a). As noted 
above, the ALJ held that the evidence established Lane had 
"committed an error in judgment but there was nothing to show 
a deliberate or willful action against the employer." 
(R.0032). As the proposed rule provides* 
If the conduct was an isolated incident 
of poor judgment and there is no 
expectation that the conduct will be 
continued or repeated, potential harm may 
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not be shown and therefore it is not 
necessary to discharge the employee. 
UDES Proposed Rule A-71-07-1:5(A)(3)(a)• The Board rejected 
the ALJ's conclusion and stated that: 
..•the Utah Supreme Court has held, in a 
case involving violation of an employer's 
rule regarding attendance, that a single 
violation of an employer's rule may be 
sufficient to warrant disqualification 
from unemployment benefits where the 
employee reasonably should have known 
that a violation would interrupt the 
employer's operations. 
Trotta v. Department of Employment Security, 664 P.2d 1195, 
1200 (Utah 1983) . 
The Boardr however, places its emphasis on two 
misconceptions. First, there is no evidence in the record 
except a written double hearsay statement made by a 
department representative submitted to the ALJ (R.0067) which 
supports the Board's finding that "the claimant's conviction 
resulted in the employer being put on a 30-day probationary 
period and could result in further legal sanctions in the 
form of the revocation of the license to sell beer". 
(R.0022). Lane spoke to the county commission and was told 
that the company was in no jeopardy whatsoever of losing its 
license. (R.0055) 
Next, the Board emphasized the company rule that 
prohibited the sale of beer to minors. However, the emphasis 
should not be on that rule but rather on whether there was a 
Telum rule or policy regarding which customers were to be 
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asked for identification and whether Lane violated that 
policy. That was the approach taken by the ALJ. The record 
is clearr as the ALJ found, there was no formal policy on 
which customers should be made to present identification 
before being allowed to purchase beer. (R.0032,0049,0056, 
0057,0071). The policy, as Lane understood it, was to ask 
for identification of anyone whose age was questionable. 
(R.0071). He did not ask for identification in the incident 
in question because the customer "looked over 21." 
(R.0057,0071). The real issue in determining culpability is 
whether Lane was at fault for not requesting identification 
from the minor to whom he sold the beer. The record is 
uncontroverted that there was no "wrongness of conduct" but 
simply a spontaneous judgment call which was later revealed 
to be incorrect. Therefore, the rationale relied upon by the 
Board as stated in Trotta, at 1200, and Kehl, at 1134, is 
factually inapplicable to the instant case and not 
controlling. Lane's conduct does not meet the culpability 
requirement of the proposed rule simply because there was a 
reasonable misjudgment in an isolated instance. 
The second element required by UDES Proposed Rule 
A71-07-l:5(A) is that Lane must have had knowledge of the 
conduct expected by the employer. Again the Board emphasized 
the company policy which prohibited the sale of beer to 
minors. However, in establishing the knowledge requirement 
it is necessary to examine the policy of which customers were 
to be asked for identification before they would be sold 
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beer. As noted above, there was no clear explanation of 
which customers were to be asked for identification. The 
proposed rule, in relevant part, provides: 
Knowledge may not be established unless 
the employer gave a clear explanation of 
the expected behavior or had a pertinent 
written policy, except in the case of a 
flagrant violation of a universal 
standard of behavior. If the employer's 
expectations are unclear, ambiguous or 
inconsistent, the existence of knowledge 
is not shown. A specific warning is one 
way of showing that the employee had 
knowledge of the expected conduct. After 
the employee is given a warning he should 
be given an opportunity to correct 
objectionable conduct. Additional 
violations occurring after the warning 
would be necessary to establish just 
cause for a discharge. 
UDES Proposed Rule A-71-07-1:5(A)(3)(b). 
The age of the person who purchased the beer was 
not questionable in Lane's mind. If Telum wished to 
establish a policy which would give direction to employees in 
a case such as this one it could have done so by, for 
example, adopting a policy requiring every purchaser of beer 
to provide identification or by requiring any purchaser of 
beer who did not appear to be over 40 years of age to provide 
identification. In any event, the policy should be made 
clear to the employees and take into consideration possible 
misjudgments. A failure to do so results in an employee not 
having knowledge of expected conduct. The basic policy that 
beer was not to be sold to minors does not provide an 
employee with guidance as to ascertaining who is not of legal 
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age to purchase beer. Knowledge can only be established in 
this case by showing that Telum had a policy of which 
customers would be requested to present identification before 
being allowed to purchase beer and that policy was clearly 
communicated to Lane. The record is devoid of any such 
showing. Simply knowing that beer was not to be sold to 
minors does not meet Telum's burden of showing a clearly 
communicated policy because it is so nonspecific that it has 
no practical application. 
A similar, but not inapplicable analogy would be to 
allow an employer to establish a company rule that employees 
must not violate state health laws and then discharge an 
employee who, for example, did not wear a hair net which was 
required by state law, even though the employee had not been 
previously instructed by the employer on how to comply with 
the law, i.e. an instruction by the employer that a hair net 
was required. By focusing on the lack of company policy on 
which customers were to provide identification before being 
allowed to purchase beer, it becomes clear that Lane had no 
clear explanation of expected behavior. Lane could not have 
known that his failure to ask for identification from the 
person whose age he determined not to be questionable would 
result in his termination. 
The third element required by Proposed Rule 
A-71-07-l:5(A) is that "The conduct must have been within the 
power and capacity of the claimant to control or prevent." 
UDES Proposed Rule A-71-07-1s5(A)(3)(c). The Board's only 
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statement that the control element was satisfied was that 
"The evidence demonstrates that the claimant was not 
prevented from checking the ID of the purchaser." (R.0022). 
Lane acknowledges that he was not prevented from requesting 
identification from the purchaser but, rather, asserts that 
he was following the policy, as he understood it, of 
requesting identification from any person whose age was 
questionable* 
Therefore, by applying UDES Proposed Rule 
A-71-07-1:5(A) to the instant case it is clear that the Board 
in reversing the ALJ's decision acted unreasonably and 
irrationaly because it focused on a broad policy rule and not 
the specific means by which the policy was to be implemented. 
Further, it was unreasonable for the Board to conclude that 
Lane's conduct was in any manner culpable or somehow wanton. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasonsf Lane submits that the 
Board of Review's application of UDES Proposed Rule 
A71-01-1:5(A) is invalid and unenforceable because it was not 
adopted pursuant to the requirements of the Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act andr therefore, its decision 
should be reversed and the ALJ's decision reinstated. 
However, even assuming arguendo that the proposed rule is 
applicable, Lane has established that he was not discharged 
for just cause. His uncontroverted testimony establishes 
that his conduct was not culpable and that he had no 
knowledge of the conduct his employer expected. Thus, the 
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Board's decision reversing the ALJ was unreasonable and 
irrational and should therefore be reversed. 
DATED this / ^ % a y of November, 1985. 
Respectfully Submitted: 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
CURTIS L. CHILD 
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PROPOSED 
A7i-U7-1:5 DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY -~ RULES AND REGULATIONS 
(II)-l 35-4-5(b) DISCHARGE 
Section 35-4-5: "An individual shall be ineligible for 
benefits or for purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
(b)(1) For the week in which he has been discharged for 
just cause or for an act or omission in connection with 
employment, not constituting a crime, which Is deliberate, 
willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful 
interest, if so found by the commission, and thereafter 
until the claimant has earned an amount equal to at least 
six times the claimant's weekly benefit amount 1n oona 
fide covered employment." 
A. GENERAL DEFINITION 
1. When an employee quits his job, there Is no question that he intended to 
become separated from that employment. The purpose of this section 1s to deny 
the benevolent benefits of the statute to individuals who bring about their own 
unemployment by conducting themselves, with respect to their employment with 
callousness, misbehavior, or lack of consideration to such a degree that the 
employer was justified in discharging the employee. However, when an employee is 
discharged by his employer, such discharge may have been the result of incompe-
tence, lack of skill, or other reasons which are beyond the claimant's control. 
The question which must be established by the evidence is whether the claimant is 
at fault in his resulting unemployment. 
2. Unemployment insurance benefits must be denied if the employer had just 
cause for discharging the employee. However, not e^ery cause for discharge pro-
vides a basis to deny benefits. In order to have just cause for discharge 
pursuant to Section 35-4-5(b)(l) there must be some fault on the part of the 
employee involved. 
3. The basic factors which establish fault, and are essential for a deter-
mination of ineligibility under the definition of just cause are: 
a
* Culpability. This is the seriousness of the conduct as it affects 
continuance of the employment relationship. The discharge must have been 
necessary to avoid actual or potential harm to the employer's rightful 
interests. A discharge would not be considered "necessary" if it 1s not 
consistent with reasonable employment practices. The wrongness of the 
conduct must be considered in the context of the particular employment and 
how it affects the employer's rights. If the conduct was an isolated 
incident of poor judgement and there is no expectation that the conduct 
will be continued or repeated, potential harm may not be shown and therefore 
it is not necessary to discharge the employee. 
b. Knowledge. 
The employee must have had a knowledge of the conduct which the employer 
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expected* I t is not necessary that the claimant intended to cause harm to 
the employer, but he should reasonably have been able to anticipate the 
effect his conduct would have. Knowledge may not be established unless the 
employer gave a clear explanation of the expected behavior or had _a 
pertinent written policy, except in the case of a flagrant violation of a 
universal standard of behavior. I f the employer's expectations are 
unclear, ambiguous or inconsistent, the existance of knowledge 1s not 
shown. A specific warning 1s one way of showing that the employee had 
knowledge of the expected conduct. After the employee is given a warning 
he should be given an opportunity to correct objectionable conduct. 
Additional violations occuring after the warning would be necessary to 
establish just cause for a discharge. 
c. Control. The conduct must have been within the power and capacity of 
the claimant to control or prevent. 
4. The term "just cause" as used In Section 5(b)(1) does not lessen the 
requirement that there be some fault on the part of the employee involved. 
Prior to the 1983 addition of the term "just cause" the Commission Interpreted 
Section 5(b)(1) to require 9it\ intentional Infliction of harm or intentional 
disregard of the employer's Interests. The intent of the Legislature in add-
ing the words "just cause" to Section 5(b)(1,) was apparently to correct this 
restrictive interpretation. While some fault must be present, i t is sufficient 
that the acts were Intended, the consequences were reasonably foreseeable, and 
that such acts have serious affect on the employee's job or the employer's 
interests. 
5. Fault may not be established when the reason for discharge Is based on 
such things as mere mistakes, inefficiency, failure of performance as the 
result of inability or Incapacity, inadvertence in isolated Instances, good-
faith errors in judgment or in the exercise of discretion, minor but casual or 
unintentional carelessness or negligence, etc. These examples of conduct are 
not disqualifying because of the lack of knowledge or control. However, contin-
ued inefficiency, repeated carelessness, or lack of care exercised by ordinary, 
reasonable workers in similar circumstances, may be disqualifying depending on 
the reason and degree of the carelessness, the knowledge and control of the 
employee. 
^ . EViUENCE-BURUEN OF PROOF S* 
l^Tfte^eyidentiary requirement for Department decisions Is a pr^pofuleranee 
of the evidernre^It is not necessary to meet criminal cour^t^ltandards of 
beyond reasonable d^Ub^^roverwhelmlng evidence. Preponderance means evidence 
which Is of greater welghtor^wu^j convincing than t^-etffdence which is offered 
1n opposition to I t ; that is, eVTxiem^wh1c|^s^a whole shows that the fact 
sought to be proved 1s more probable ^h$B>«#$!. Although the evidence that Is 
required for an appeal decision im^Wof probltTv*^4lue, an init ial determin-
ation may be made based orj^thfbest or most logical^hrfojcmation available. 
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